Proximity verification has a wide range of security applications such as zero-interaction or multi-factor authentication, groupmembership management and many more. To achieve high easeof-use, a recently proposed class of solutions exploit contextual information captured by onboard sensors including radio (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and GPS receivers), ambient sound (microphones), movement (accelerometers) and physical environment (light, temperature and humidity) to facilitate the verification process with minimal user involvement. Active acoustic methods have some advantages over many others: they work indoors, they can take the shape of the enclosure and barriers into account, they do not require pre-installed infrastructure and they are relatively fast.
Abstract-
Proximity verification has a wide range of security applications such as zero-interaction or multi-factor authentication, groupmembership management and many more. To achieve high easeof-use, a recently proposed class of solutions exploit contextual information captured by onboard sensors including radio (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and GPS receivers), ambient sound (microphones), movement (accelerometers) and physical environment (light, temperature and humidity) to facilitate the verification process with minimal user involvement. Active acoustic methods have some advantages over many others: they work indoors, they can take the shape of the enclosure and barriers into account, they do not require pre-installed infrastructure and they are relatively fast.
In this paper we propose R-Prox, an approach for proximity verification based on acoustic Room Impulse Response (RIR). In R-Prox, one device actively emits a short, wide-band audible chirp and all participating devices record reflections of the chirp from the surrounding environment. From this signal, we extract features on different frequency bands and compare them for a copresence verdict.This RIR-based method is less dependent on pre-existing sound than passive ambient sound methods and more resilient to relay attacks since it is, by its very nature, dependent on the physical surroundings. We evaluate our method by collecting RIR data with various Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) mobile devices. We present an application to collect data from multiple devices simultaneously. We then train a binary classification model to determine copresence using RIR features. We show R-Prox to be sensitive, with false negative verdicts can be as low as 0.059 of the true copresence cases. Although R-Prox's false positive rate is not as low (in case rooms are likely having similar acoustic RIR), we show that it can be effectively combined with schemes like Sound-Proof (which suffers from high false positive rates in some adversarial settings) so that the resulting system has high accuracy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of ubiquitous and low-cost sensing capabilities on modern smart devices, we have witnessed a large range of easy-to-use applications that increase security for end-users. For example, users can securely access a remote web service which requires strong authentication with almost the same experience as password-based without having extra interactions [20] . That authentication leverages contextual information to automatically verify the proximity of the user's personal phone and the computer in use. Another example is automatic group-membership management for content sharing without requiring members to perform any explicit action [39] . This broad class of applications covers varying security aspects from web authentication [20] , authenticated session migration [18] , zero interaction authentication [7] , [40] and secure pairing [33] , [39] .
These applications rely on the same generic approach of device-proximity verification with minimal user involvement thanks to the capacity of devices to handle communication over wireless channels. We define the general process of proximity verification as involving two devices, a prover P and a verifier V; V confirms the proximity of P if P can provide sufficient evidence that it is nearby. We allow simultaneous verification instances between the verifier and different provers.
Prior research has demonstrated that wireless device-todevice communication is often vulnerable to relay attack [13] , [14] . A relay attack involves a pair of colluding attackers who relay messages between legitimate P and V, extending the range at which their verification method works, thereby fooling V into incorrectly concluding that P is in close proximity.
One of the earliest proposals for secure device proximity verification between two devices is the Brands and Chaum distance bounding technique [4] . However, the technique requires high accuracy of distance estimate based on roundtrip-time, therefore, it needs to deploy at the low level of the communication layer, and often on special (customized) hardware [29] .
An alternative approach to mitigate relay attacks, easier to deploy in practice, is based on context. This approach starts with the hypothesis that two devices in close proximity perceive similar ambient context. Devices can verify their physical proximity by sampling their surrounding environment and comparing their observations for similarities. Various works have demonstrated the feasibility of using different context modalities for proximity verification, such as audio [16] , [20] , [39] , radio [44] , [40] , [14] and physical environment [35] . While offering important benefits to mitigate relay attacks, integrity of context information is susceptible to adversarial manipulation, i.e. context attack, as demonstrated by Shrestha et al. [37] , [36] . An example of a system that operates well under normal circumstances becomes vulnerable with presence of context attacker is Sound-Proof [20] . Sound-Proof, a very promising copresence verification technique based on ambient audio, typically exhibits high accuracy. But in certain circumstances (such as two different rooms in a city each having a television tuned to the same channel) Sound-Proof is vulnerable to 100% false positive rate. Also, Sound-Proof is vulnerable to phone call attack, demonstrated by Shrestha et al. Shrestha:2016 :SPD:2976749.2978328.
To enhance the robustness of context against manipulation, we explore active use of audio context that represents a location's physical characteristic. We observe in nature that for echolocation, bats emit high frequency sounds and listen to how they are reflected by the environment; dolphins also use a similar echolocation technique. Inspired by these, we make use of Room Impulse Response (RIR) which depends both on sound waves within a physical enclosure as well as on the shape and the materials of the enclosure. Sound travels via multiple paths from the source to reach the receiver. These paths are significantly influenced by the boundaries and the obstacles in the enclosing space. Thus, we conjecture that the RIR's attributes constitute a practically unique location signature. Mimicking the acoustic features of an enclosure in a different one is challenging for relay attackers. It requires them to change the structure of the enclosing space which is considerably more difficult than streaming audio signals as used in current context attacks.
We introduce a new approach, R-Prox, for proximity verification using RIR on Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) devices. One among a group of devices in close proximity actively emits a wide-band chirp and all devices simultaneously record the reverberated signals from their environment. From the recorded signals, we extract the RIR and its acoustic features over different frequency bands. We then check how similar these features are by using a machine learning classification model (trained in a separate process prior to deployment). In particular, R-Prox has the following advantages:
• It verifies truly copresent devices with low false negative rate (can be as low as 0.059 in our experiments). • It requires no special hardware and can be easily deployed on COTS devices. • It is fast as it requires only one to two seconds to obtain sufficient reverberated signals. • It is privacy-preserving since it requires no raw ambient audio to be sent to a third party. • It enhances resilience of secure proximity verification against relay and context attackers.
The false positive rate (FPR) of R-Prox (reporting a verdict of copresence for devices that are non-copresent) is up to 0.35. If R-Prox were to be used as a standalone solution for copresence verification, the high FPR would constitute a vulnerability. However, R-Prox can be used effectively with other context-based copresence schemes so that the resulting composite copresence scheme has both high accuracy and is highly resistant to relay and context attackers. In particular, we show that running Sound-Proof and R-Prox in a pipeline (that is, R-Prox is run if and only if Sound-Proof returns a positive verdict), the FPR can be reduced from 1 to 0.35.
The contributions of the paper are as follows.
• We designed a new proximity verification solution for COTS devices, based on RIR concepts, which we call R-Prox (Section III). • We proposed and implemented an effective method to measure RIR signals on COTS devices in a short time (2 seconds) (Section IV-B). • We developed an Android application to collect audio samples on different COTS smartphones. We demonstrated the feasibility of R-Prox in practice by using these samples to determine copresence (Section V-A). • We constructed a real-life dataset by using this application to collect RIR data from different types of rooms in practical settings and used the dataset to build a classifier to predict copresence. We analyzed the performance in the presence of attackers (Section V-B) and demonstrated the benefits of R-Prox in comparison to prior work (Section V-C). • We showed that combination of R-Prox with other context-based copresence techniques such as Sound-Proof can result in copresence verification methods that are significantly stronger in the presence of attackers (Section V-E).
II. RIR-BASED DEVICE PROXIMITY VERIFICATION

A. Room-based proximity verification
In typical context-based proximity verification settings, devices equipped with an array of sensors sample their environment, often for sound or radio signals, and use similarities they share in common as evidence of copresence. When two devices are located in the same room (i.e. copresent), they would observe similar information. When they are located in two different rooms (non-copresent), their observations should have less similarities. Fig. 1 depicts room-based proximity scenarios.
Room 1
Room 2 copresent case non-copresent case This kind of sampling is usually passive observation, and relies on the environment to have something to observe. In some situations, the context information observable in the environment is insufficient; for example, in passive ambient noise sampling, all completely silent rooms sound exactly the same. One strategy to combat such a situation is to inject context into the environment and have the devices observe that.
B. The concept of Room Impulse Response (RIR)
An impulse response is the response of a system to an impulsive stimulus. In this work we consider sound systems and their acoustic environments, i.e. by "system" we refer to the collective of involved parts such as the space, walls and obstacles within a room, but also the speakers and microphones on the devices. Fig. 2 depicts how a sound is perceived in an enclosed space. When emitted from a speaker, a sound is distributed, albeit unevenly, in every direction, travelling multiple paths of different lengths. This results in multiple arrivals at the receiver. Sound that travels the shortest path (direct sound) arrives first and is the loudest. Sound that has traveled through other paths starts arriving soon after, with delay directly and loudness inversely proportional to the path length. Along all paths, air and surfaces absorb some of the energy of the sound.
An acoustic impulse response is created by how the sound is reflected along this multitude of paths; how much they are delayed, how much they are weakened, how much is the total sound energy received etc. The paths, and hence the impulse response, is heavily affected by the enclosed space such as walls, ceiling, obstacles, the power of the sound source, and the position and orientation of the sound source and the receiver. In a Linear-Time-Invariant system (LTI), an RIR can describe the acoustic characteristics of sound reflections for a specific source-receiver configuration. We need to ensure RIR is a linear function of time a system response to an input. If the system under the test is not LTI, distortion artifacts will appear (see Section III-A for methods that strictly requires LTI systems). For non LTI systems, the method to measure RIR, for example, sine sweep, must allow to extract the linear part of the RIR.
In a room having impulse response h(k), injecting the input audio signal s(k) creates a reverberant signal x(k) = s(k) * h(k) where k is time and * indicates convolution. Information of an acoustic system includes arrival times and frequencies of direct sound, reflections, reverberant decay characteristics, signal-to-noise ratio, and overall frequency response (see Fig. 3 ). Theoretically, two non-identical rooms should not have identical impulse responses. A room however does not have just a single RIR; the placement and orientation of the sender and receiver also affect the system. In practice, how distinguishable RIRs are will largely depend on the way they are measured. Fig. 3 , describes what an RIR looks like in time domain. Propagation delay is the time it takes for direct sound to travel from the source to the receiver. The first part of the RIR is the arrival of the direct sound. After that, the earliest reflected sounds (lowest order reflections) start arriving, followed by sound traveling along the multitude of longer paths (higher order reflections, reverberant space). Noise floor is the point where we can no longer distinguish the reverberant sound from the background noise. Energy absorption by air and surface materials causes reverberant sound to decay as a function of time (distance).
In practice, sometimes the difference between direct sounds and early reflections is not as clear as in this case. Reverberant decay is usually measured in the range from 5 dB below level of direct sound to a point of 60 dB below that on the backward energy curve of the RIR. Noise in the measurement can come from different sources including ambient noise and electrical noise.
C. Threat model
In our system model, we have the prover P and the verifier V. V tries to deduce whether P is located in the same place or not, based on evidence provided by P. The goal of the attacker is to make V wrongly deduce that the parties are in the same place when in reality they are not. We assume that P and V have previously established a secure and authenticated wireless communications channel, and that the security is based on a strong cryptographic protocol. The parties themselves have not been compromised. We assume that the attacker has standard Dolev-Yao [9] capabilities (intercept, modify, insert or reorder messages between P and V) as well as context attacker [37], [36] capabilities with respect to ambient audio (capture, transfer, reproduce audio in the vicinity of bothP and V), and that the attacker's link between the attack sites is reliable and fast.
When the parties are within the range of their wireless channel, they can send messages to each other directly ( Fig. 4-1) . A relay attack extends the range of this wireless channel. If the parties treat the operating range of the wireless link as a mechanism for copresence verification, a relay attack causes V to reach the wrong copresence verdict and the attack succeeds ( Fig. 4-2 ). The attack does not compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or authenticity of the messages, but for the declared goal, it doesn't have to.
Proximity verification based on context mitigates the relay attack. When the devices are copresent, their wireless channel works and they perceive similar things in their environment ( Fig. 4-3 ). Non-copresent and under relay attack, their wireless communication is still successful, but the parties disagree on what they perceive in their environment, and V can hence reach a negative verdict.
Some types of context are easy to manipulate. For example, a simple ambient sound comparison can be guided to produce the same result by exploiting instances the ambient sound is the same (e.g., many households tuned to the same TV channel during a popular live event) at both sites or by streaming the ambient sound from one site to the other. Wi-Fi, Bluetooth or GPS signals can be spoofed. P, V or both, depending on the scenario, perceive the manipulated context, and might conclude that their contexts are similar. A successful context attack restores the vulnerability to a relay attack ( Fig. 4-4 ).
In this work, we propose RIR as a new, more robust type of context for proximity verification, which is less prone to manipulation. We assess the robustness of our approach against the threat model consisting of relay attackers and context attackers.
D. Evaluation metric
We evaluate our solution based on three criteria: security, usability and deployability.
• Security: In systems where copresence verification is important, a positive copresence verdict usually enables functionality. For example a car might allow doors to be opened only if the key is present. For the system to be secure, it needs to verify non-copresence cases properly and not give positive verdicts when the devices are non-copresent. We evaluate security based on the False Positive Rate (FPR) of the copresence verdicts. • Usability: Since a negative copresence verdict usually disables or locks functionality, a system that always errs for caution is not very usable. The system needs to be sensitive enough to verify if the devices are copresent and give positive verdicts when they are. We evaluate usability based on the False Negative Rate (FNR) of the copresence verdicts. • Deployability: The solution should be easy to deploy in practice. It should work on commodity devices, such as smartphones and tablets, and not require special hardware or infrastructure. It should also be generic enough to work across a heterogeneous set of devices, and not require tight synchronization.
III. ROOM IMPULSE RESPONSE MEASUREMENT
In this section we provide details about recording RIR samples, discuss what are the useful features that can be extracted, and what challenges are involved when collecting RIR measurements with COTS devices.
A. Sine sweep method to measure RIR
A common method for measuring RIR is to apply a known input signal and measure the system's output. Therefore the choice of a measurement method concerns the excitation signal and the deconvolution technique. To accurately measure meaningful RIR features, the excitation signal and the deconvolution technique have to maximize the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) and allow to eliminate non linear artifacts in the deconvolved impulse response.
The simplest technique to measure RIR is to excite a room with a short pulse and then measure the room's response. Various methods to measure RIR using impulsive excitation signals have been developed. Stan et al. [38] conducted extensive experiments to compare four RIR measurement methods: the MLS (Maximum-Length Sequence) technique [32] , the IRS (Inverse Repeated Sequence) technique [11] , the TSP (Time-Stretched Pulses) technique [3] , and the Sine Sweep technique [12] . They show that the best choice from these methods depends critically on the measurement conditions. The MLS, IRS and Time-Stretched Pulses methods require the system to be linear and time invariant (LTI). When this condition is not fulfilled, distortion artifacts will appear in the deconvolved impulse response (see Fig. 5 ). The sine sweep technique overcomes this limitation. It uses an exponential time-growing frequency sweep as the excitation signal. The output of the system in response to the sine sweep input consists of both the linear response to the excitation and of harmonic distortion at various orders due to the nonlinearity. A deconvolution of the recorded output can be used to compute the RIR. Linear impulse response is the first order harmonic in the deconvolved result.
To measure a system's RIR, we emit an excitation input signal into the system and record the system's output. We then compute a discrete Fourier transform (using FFT) for both the input signal and the recorded signal. The FFT transform of a signal represents amplitudes and phases of individual frequencies in the signal. When we have the FFT transforms of the signals, we compute their deconvolution to get the Transfer Function. The Transfer Function shows how each frequency has been affected by the system. Next we compute the inverse FFT (IFFT) of the transfer function to convert it to time domain; the output of this conversion is our RIR. 
B. RIR features
Reverberation time (RT) represents the time it takes for a reverberating signal to decay until it can no longer be distinguished from other sounds. RT can be a single value even when measured for a wide band signal, for example a sweep from 20 Hz to 20 kHz. It can also be computed for different frequency bands separately (1 octave, 1/3 octave, 1/6 octave, etc.).
A band covers a specific range of frequencies, with a lower bound f l and an upper bound f h . Octave bands are identified by their middle frequency f 0 . A band is one octave in width when the upper band frequency is twice that of the lower band frequency, f l = f 0 /2 1/2 , f h = f 0 × 2 1/2 . An one-third octave band has f l = f 0 /(2 1/2 ) 1/3 = f 0 /2 1/6 and f h = f 0 × (2 1/2 ) 1/3 = f 0 × 2 1/6 . Reverberation time will be different for different frequency bands, and hence it should be indicated if the RT applies for a specific band. Evaluating the RT for each band separately gives us insight into how sound is perceived in the acoustic reverberant space.
One of the most accurate method to compute RT is based on studying the decay curve. According to Schroeder [31] the energy curve is a curve obtained by backwards integration of the squared impulse response, which ideally starts from a point where the response falls into the noise floor. The method is called the Schroeder integral method.
The slope of Schroeder curve is used to measure how fast the impulse response decays. For instance, RT60 is the time it takes for a sound to decay by 60 dB. In practice, the level of direct sound might be less than 60 dB above the noise floor. In such cases, RT30 and RT20 are used instead. RT30 is the time a sound would decay 60 dB when extrapolated from a 30 dB decay range in the Schroeder curve (often from -5 dB to -35 dB). RT20 accordingly is extrapolated from a 20 dB decay range (from -5 dB to -20 dB).
Beside RT, there are other RIR features used for particular purposes of acoustical analysis. Early Decay Time (EDT) is derived from reverberation decay curve, conventionally in the section between 0 dB and 10 dB below the level of direct sound. EDT therefore is the reverberation time measured over the first 10 dB of the decay. It gives information of overall signal clarity and intelligibility in a room. Early-to-late energy ratio is a measure of the sound energy arriving within some specified interval after direct sound (first n milliseconds) over the energy in the remaining part of the impulse response. For example, clarity ratios C10, C35, C50, C80 are the early-tolate ratios (in dB) at 10, 35, 50, and 80 milliseconds as split times. Direct-to-Reverberant Ratio (DRR) is another useful measure for assessing the acoustic configuration. In this work, we use the acoustic analysis programs REW [1] and Smaart [2] to extract RIR features from our RIR measurements.
IV. R-PROX PROXIMITY VERIFICATION APPROACH A. Basic idea of R-Prox
R-Prox is a proximity verification approach based on RIR. Fig. 7 illustrates the R-Prox approach at a high level. As a general context based proximity verification, without losing generality to having large number of devices, we consider R-Prox consists of a pair of devices (P, V) that have microphones and speakers. One of the devices, conventionally V, emits a known sound S in the environment surrounding P and V. The way they capture S depends on how S is affected by the sound field it travels through resulting in reverberated signals S [rb,V ] and S [rb,P ] . Reverberated signals are the convolution of source signal and the impulse response of acoustic system i.e. the room.
The RIR signal h is computed based on the sound source (input) and the reverberated signal (the system's output). RIR features are extracted and classified to make a copresence decision. When P and V are in proximity such as being in the same room, we observe that S [rb,V ] ≈ S [rb,P ] , or more precisely, h [P ] ≈ h [V ] . In that case, we decide that P and V are copresent, otherwise, P and V are non-copresent.
A sound signal is heavily affected by the surrounding space. It is different from radio signals that can travel through the walls of the enclosure. This property allows two devices to perceive audio signals differently when they are in physical proximity but not in same enclosure, for example, when they are on different sides of a wall.
B. Our RIR measurement using COTS devices
The overall challenge for COTS devices to measure RIR is to properly select the measurement parameters, such as excitation level and measurement duration.
1) Excitation level: By emitting the signal, we expect to generate an output which has power at least 40-50 dB above that of the noise floor level. In the reverberation time measurements, we evaluate reverberant decay over a range starting from 5 dB below the direct sound down to 20 or 30 dB (ideally 60 dB) below the start point. The lower end of the range needs to be at least 10 dB above the noise floor level. With this expectation we would emit the excitation signal at the highest level that the source device can provide. However, if the signal is too loud for the receiver, the recorded signal will be clipped. A clipped signal is a measurement error that prevents successful extraction of RIR features. The challenge is thus to ensure enough excitation of the acoustic space, while at the same time avoiding the clipping effect.
2) Measurement duration: One or two seconds is a reasonable time to measure the reverberation time in small rooms, such as home or office, to medium size rooms like an auditorium. Larger spaces can have longer reverberation time. If preliminary measurement setting do not return good measurement results, we can adjust duration and measure again. A sweep of 500 ms or 1s is sufficient for measuring small spaces. In our experiments we use a sweep of two seconds to cover a wider range of rooms.
3) RIR measurement in details: In our measurements, we use a collection of mobile devices. All devices record while one of them emits a chirp at the same time. All recording is done in 44100 Hz 16 bit PCM and the signal we use is a linear sine sweep from 0 to 22050 Hz in two seconds. To ensure that initializing the audio system does not cut away from our signal, we pad it with one second of silence in the beginning and two seconds in the end, making the full sample five seconds long.
To process a recording, we first align the recorded signal with the original generated signal, and remove the parts before the beginning of the sine sweep and after 500 ms past the end of the sine sweep, leaving us with just the sweep and the reverberation. We then normalize the recorded signal to account for decreased volume caused by the recording process.
We compute the RIR from the recording as follows (c.f. Fig. 6 ).
1) Convert the recorded signal (output) x(k) and the generated signal (input) s(k) from time domain to frequency domain by FFT. 2) Compute the time reversal of the input signal and convolve it with the recorded signal to find the room impulse response (transfer function). 3) Convert the transfer function from frequency domain to time domain by IFFT to find the linear room impulse response. 4) Extract features from the linear room impulse response. We need to remove artifacts caused by noise, non-linear behavior of loudspeaker and time-variance. Due to harmonic distortion problem, only first order harmonic signal is used. First order harmonic is detected based on the highest peak in energy decay curve. We find the highest peak and cut from 100 ms before that until 750 ms after. Background noise level is determined by energy level of 10 ms before direct sound of the first order harmonic. We prepare RIR data for analysis by smoothing the signal and removing infinities that are introduced in the previous steps.
C. Features for proximity verification in R-Prox
1) Initial approach: The basic idea of our proximity verification is based on the similarity of two RIR signals h [P ] and h [V ] . Due to different influencing factors such as device hardware, the distance and direction between the listener and sound source, and the noise floor level, we can barely obtain a good match of h [P ] and h [V ] . Fig. 8 shows how different devices perceive the same signal in the same room, at the same time.
We tested the simplest way of computing a simple cross correlation in time domain of two recorded signals from two devices, as well as from two extracted room impulse response signals without going into special characteristics. The similarity comparison results did not allow us to recognize two copresent devices or to distinguish two non-copresent devices properly. Other ways to compare room impulse response in frequency domain based on Power Spectral Density (PSD), MFCC, and Reverberation Time of wide band signal did not bring us desirable results either. Our preliminary tests reveal that common methods to compare similarity of signals; such as cross correlation [16] , Mel Frequency Cepstral (MFCC) and Linear Predictive Coding (LPC) [30] ; temporal features, spectral features and energetic features [19] ; do not work for using RIR to solve the proximity verification problem. This led us to try acoustic features extracted from RIR.
2) RIR features and copresence distance: To verify two copresent/non-copresent devices, we extract series of acoustic features (RT60, EDT, D/R, C10, C35, C50, C80) on 32 frequency bands. Frequencies vary from 0 to 22050 Hz (wideband (1), octave bands (10) and one-third octave bands (21) for RIR signals. These acoustic features form a vector of 224 elements (see Fig. 9 ).
We denote each device d i in room r j with < d i , r j >. A pair of (< d 1 , r 1 >, < d 2 , r 2 >) is copresent if r 1 = r 2 , and non-copresent if r 1 = r 2 . A RIR feature vector − → v i,j represents the tuple < d i , r j >. The notation < − −− → v d1,r1 , − −− → v d2,r2 > represents the copresence or non-copresence for the pair (< d 1 , r 1 >, < d 2 , r 2 >) in the corresponding sample. From this pair, we compute the vector of the squared difference:
We use the difference vector with associated copresence labels for running the classification task (cf. Section V). Note that we apply feature selection before running the classification, therefore only the most discriminative RIR features are kept in the difference vector for copresent/non-copresent samples. 
V. EVALUATION
To evaluate R-Prox, we collected a small-scale dataset, ran experiments with different settings, and analysed the (machine-learning-based-classification) proximity verification performance.
A. Experiment setup and data collection
We developed an Android app and a backend server to facilitate collection of RIR sample measurements. To initiate sample collection, we send a broadcast message over the network that instructs one device to emit a series of chirp signals, and all devices, including the emitter, to record them. After the samples have been recorded, the devices will package them and send them to the backend server, from which we fetch them for analysis.
Triggering the sample collection over the network allows us to record on many devices at the same time without needing to tap buttons on many screens, and makes synchronizing the emitting and recording easier. To account for the different amount of delay that the devices experienced and to make sure that the entire signal gets played through the speaker, we prepared our audio files with a few seconds of silence padding both before and after the signal. We also implemented a loudness calibration feature to avoid unwanted effects such as signal clipping.
We collected our measurements with a set of 9 smartphones of 6 different models. The data collection took place around our research laboratory campus in 9 different rooms (Table I) .
In each room we collected data in two different locations (Loc1 and Loc2) and phones were put on a hanger (Fig. 10) . We chose the emitting device randomly at the beginning of each session, and placed the listener devices in a circle around it at a distance of 30 cm. We repeated each recording five times, i.e. each device collected five samples per session. Table II presents details of our dataset.
We then extracted a vector of 224 RIR features for each sample and computed the average of the 5 samples collected by the device to obtain one feature vector for the setting < d i , r j >. At the end, we achieved a dataset that contains 343 < d i , r j > records for Loc1, and 303 records for Loc2. We discarded recordings that had failed for any reason.
From the raw sweep recordings, we applied techniques presented previously in Section III to extract our RIR feature vec- tors. For all recordings that have the same room label, we created the set of copresent pairs < d i1,rj 1 , d i2,rj 2 > (r j1 = r j2 ). The rest form the set of non-copresent pairs. We collected data in two locations in each room, we ended up having 2 different datasets: Loc1 and Loc2. Table II shows the number of copresent and non-copresent samples in each set. Note that we use the squared difference vector We applied the t-SNE algorithm [43] to visualize distribution of copresence and non-copresence samples. Fig. 11 shows how those samples are distributed in their feature space. We can clearly see the copresent samples are clustered together. This indicates a clear separation between the copresent and non-copresent classes.
B. Copresence and non-copresence classification
In this experiment, we ran different tests to assess the performance of proximity verification using RIR acoustic features. We consider proximity verification as a classification task for labeling two classes: copresent (positive class) and non-copresent (negative class). We tested different supervised learning algorithms and settled with RandomForest which performs best among all.
As we consider samples recorded under the same label to be copresent, and since a label is equal only to itself, our dataset is heavily imbalanced towards non-copresent samples. This imbalance comes from the pairing method to generate our copresence/non-copresence samples. When training the classifier, we addressed the imbalance by undersampling the non-copresent set using the RandomUnderSampler algorithm in Scikit-learn [27] to get a balanced training set. We do not alter the balance in the actual testing set.
Feature engineering has vital impact on classification result. In our experiment setting, though the feature vector has 244 elements, many of them are not informative for copresence and non-copresence separation. We applied feature selection to select only the 15 most characterizing features for the classifier. We used the RandomForestRegressor algorithm implemented in Scikit-learn platform to identify those 15 best features: ['RT60-13Oct-8kHz', 'RT60-13Oct-6.3kHz', 'RT60-Oct-4kHz', 'RT60-13Oct-5kHz', 'RT60-Oct-8kHz', 'RT60all-all', 'C80-Oct-2kHz', 'RT60-13Oct-2.5kHz', 'RT60-Oct-2kHz', 'RT60-13Oct-1.6kHz', 'RT60-Oct-1kHz', 'RT60-13Oct-10kHz', 'C80-13Oct-1.6kHz', 'RT60-13Oct-4kHz', 'C80-Oct-16kHz'].
We cross validated the four datasets 5-fold. Of each dataset we divided the data into 5 subsets (folds). In each run, we used 2 subsets for training the classification model and the remaining subset for testing. The confusion matrix in Table III shows our classification results. From confusion matrices we derived two evaluation criteria: FNR (for usability assessment); and FPR (for benign setting security assessment). Fig. 12 visualizes FPR and FNR performance.
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Positive 224 From Fig. 12 we see that the FNRs of R-Prox to predict copresence are of 0.059 and 0.1.
The FPR is high (of 0.342 and 0.35). This is not surprising, since both datasets contain 4 among 9 rooms (i.e offices, c.f. Table I ) that have very similar physical characteristics. The similarity of rooms as we saw in their descriptions causes noncopresence samples that are indistinguishable from copresence samples.
The classification results show that R-Prox is reliable to identify correctly copresence devices. The false positive rates indicate the impact of room characteristics. Intuitively speaking, if two devices are in two rooms with similar RIR acoustic features, R-Prox is unlikely to be able to distinguish them. This means RIR signals recorded and extracted from COTS devices are not sensitive enough to capture difference of obstacles in similar rooms.
For future improvement, the alternative approach for the RIR similarity comparison can be done by applying deep learning techniques [15] instead of using the classic supervised learning technique as in our current work. Deep learning techniques learn the features from the raw data, and hence do not require pre-defined classification features, but they do require a large enough dataset for training. We leave this for future work.
C. Security and usability analysis 1) Usability: We evaluate the usability for device-proximity verification through the False Negative Rate (FNR). In our experiments, we find that R-Prox verifies the true copresence cases with a very high sensitivity. By our design goals this translates to very high usability; our FNR is at the highest at 0.1, and at its lowest at 0.059. See Fig. 12 for details.
2) Relay attack and context attack analysis: Our work applies RIR context for the device-proximity verification to defend against relay attack. The FPR indicates security. The results in previous section show that FPR is at its lowest at 0.342 and at its highest at 0.35. The high FPR is caused by the similarity of RIR signals of nearly-identical rooms. This implies that attackers can perform the opportunistic attack by waiting until the two devices are located in nearly-identical rooms. Even though it can be attacked, attackers cannot actively control when and where the two devices are in the same context.
We asked ourselves whether it would be possible to combine R-Prox with other approaches to reduce the FPR while not increasing much FNR in the presence of relay attackers. It is possible is our answer. We can use R-Prox in a pipeline or in parallel to another system in cases where the other system complements R-Prox (e.g. by having low FPR in general, or having a tendency to report false positive in different circumstances than R-Prox).
In case of parallel combination, we consider the combination of R-Prox and ambient audio, addressed in previous work [41] , [20] .
Truong et al. [41] reported performance of ambient audio in the absence of context attackers (FNR = 0.199, FPR = 0.093). However, under the presence of a relay attacker, the FPR increases to 1. In Sound-Proof [20] the FPR is of 1. The worst result from our experiments with R-Prox (z 1 ) is (Loc1), with FNR of 0.059 and FPR of 0.35. If we combine it with ambient audio (z 2 ), which has a FPR of 1 under context attack, and decide that the copresence decision for the combination (z 1 · z 2 ) is positive only if both modalities return positive, we have FPR(z 1 · z 2 ) ≤ min(FPR(z 1 ), FPR(z 2 )). RIR and ambient audio are two independent variables; when either modality returns a negative decision, the output decision is also negative. The false positive happens only when both modalities fail to assert the negative copresence. Table IV shows the impact of combining R-Prox and ambient audio.
Regardless of context attackers, combining two approaches significantly reduces FPR to be equal or less than the smaller of the two FPRs. However, FNR of the combination increases as well. Since if either of the methods returns negative, the overall decision is negative, the method with the higher FNR R-Prox Audio [40] sets the lower bound for the combined FNR. The upper bound is when the false negatives of the other method are always different from the first one method. The combined FNR should hence fall between max(FNR(z 1 ), FNR(z 2 )) and FNR(z 1 ) + FNR(z 2 ). This is an unavoidable trade-off between usability and security. In the absence of context attackers, the combination reduces FPR of R-Prox caused by the similarity of nearly identical rooms. In the presence of context attackers, we consider that the context attack does not affect R-Prox (as analyzed in previous section), therefore the combination reduces FPR of ambient audio caused by the attack.
It is also possible to extend R-Prox by combining it with other sensor modalities e.g. Wi-Fi, Bluetooth to reduce FPR. We believe that R-Prox, while offering good usability, also helps to improve security against relay and context attacks.
3) Qualitative context-attack analysis: Our design goals include security, usability, and deployability. The R-Prox approach offers by-design the deployability because we designed the system for COTS devices. Evaluation results show that, first the hardware variance does not impact the proximity verification performance; and second COTS devices can effectively capture reverberated sound. In the rest of this section, we will analyse in details the two metrics: security and usability.
Regarding context attackers who defeat a context-based proximity verification to wrongly output a positive verdict for non-copresent devices by manipulating the context that P and V use. The available attacking techniques are the signal relays between two end-devices. Prior research has demonstrated the vulnerability of wireless device-to-device communication to context attacks. Building a proximity verification which is resilient to context attacks remains challenging. Shrestha et al. [37] , [36] showed that it is possible to stream ambient sound. The demonstrated attack on ambient audio sets all approaches using that context at risk.
With R-Prox, we assume attackers cannot control reverberated sound, i.e., force the sound to reverberate in a specific way. Hence R-Prox is more resilient to context manipulation attacks than ambient-audio-based approaches. Even if having the ability to stream, attackers are still not able to control the reverberated sound. To achieve S [rb,V ] ≈ S [rb,P ] , perfectly recording and relaying by using high-end devices is not enough as devices perceive the same reverberated sound differently when they are in different acoustic environments. In our experiments, the exactly same wide band chirp was emitted in different rooms. Only similar (nearly identical) rooms return similar RIR signals. Most rooms with different characteristic return different RIR outputs.
We imagine a possible specific attack to R-Prox by "room simulation". We assume that an attacker knows the acoustic properties of the room where the P is located and the sound source S. He thus can estimate reverberated sound and adapt the signal at V to fool V having similar acoustic properties to P's. To succeed with this setting, the attacker might also have to operate faster than time-out limit of the verification process. We have not experimented with this non trivial attack.
D. Advantages of R-Prox
In this section we analyse the advantages of R-Prox, in comparison with state-of-the-art solutions for proximity verification. We select common criteria relevant to proximity verification including sensing method, FNR, FPR, hardware variance, sensing duration, privacy-preserving, distance between devices, and the security against relay attack. Table V shows our comparison of R-Prox to previous approaches. R-Prox is among few acoustic based solution offering active sensing. Instead of relying passively on ambient audio, in R-Prox devices actively emit a chirp sound to generate audio source for reverberation such that other devices in close proximity can record and measure. Therefore, with R-Prox copresence decision is less dependent on the quality of ambient noise than with approaches solely based on ambient audio. R-Prox, in our experiment, reached the most optimal result at FNR of 0.059 and FPR of 0.342, even across different device models. To defend against relay attacker, higher FPR indicates that R-Prox is less secure against the attack than previously existing approaches. However, in combining with other sensors, as elaborated in previous section, we can lower the FPR. In the presence of context attacker, R-Prox is more robust than existing context, as previously analyzed.
The sensing time required by R-Prox is among the shortest, being only two seconds. With small spaces, an even shorter chirp signal (500 ms or 1 s) may be sufficient.
Another considerable benefit of R-Prox is its privacypreserving characteristic. It requires only RIR acoustic features for the proximity verification that do not include sensitive ambient context information like in ambient audio based approaches. In applications involving third parties, such as remote server or cloud based services, raw ambient audio has a higher risk of privacy breach. 
E. Discussion
In this section, first we clarify few limitations of R-Prox and at the same time suggest potential improvements to overcome them.
Small scale experiment with only audible sound: Our results are limited to the size of dataset and ambient factors. The number of rooms and devices are small. Therefore we have not estimated the entropy of RIR information for rooms.
We have not controlled background noise levels or tested with different distances from emitter to listener. All our experiments were made in the presence of the audible excitation signal emitted by one device, and the results should therefore reflect R-Prox's performance under an active attack where an attacker plays the excitation signal near the victim. If both devices could not observe the impulse, R-Prox would give a negative copresence verdict. As long as the impulse is audible, such an active attack on R-Prox would be easy to detect. Current R-Prox uses a wide-band audible chirp for measuring RIR. We have not tested the model with inaudible sound. This is very challenging with the limited capacity of current COTS devices to emit and record reflections of such high frequency sound. We leave this for future work.
Usability: In the discussion so far, we used FNR as a proxy for usability on the grounds that user irritation correlates with negative copresence decisions from the system when the devices are in fact copresent. This is a narrow definition of usability. Other aspects of the system have an impact on usability as well. For example, the need to emit an audible sine sweep in R-Prox may annoy users and bystanders. Our approach of combining R-Prox with other mechanisms like Sound-Proof reduces the need for this. We leave the evaluation of usability in a broader sense outside the scope of this paper.
Noise floor domination: Audio based approaches are vulnerable to the noise-floor-domination attack. With this attack, attackers actively control ambient noise at both ends so that recorded signals become indistinguishable for the two devices. R-Prox is also not robust to this attack. If the noise floor levels at both devices are too high, making the SNR of the reverberated sound low, then it is difficult for COTS devices to capture the reverberation sound. In practice, we often need specific device to emit loud enough audio source to achieve quality reverberation.
In following, we revisit applications of device-proximity verification and discuss how we can apply R-Prox to their enhance security.
Multi-factor authentication: R-Prox has high potential usage for multi-factor authentication (MFA) to enhance security while retain ease-of-use, similar to Sound-Proof [20] . Being different from Sound-Proof, R-Prox is an active sensing method and it is more resilient to context attacks. In practice, Sound-Proof and R-Prox complement each other and both of them together can strengthen the security of the MFA while ensuring similar password-based experience to users. Sound-Proof is accurate but also is vulnerable to relay attacks and has FPR of 1 when two locations have similar ambient audio e.g. same TV broadcast channels. R-Prox can fix this security flaw because it is more resilient to relay attack and it can identify non-copresence when two locations with different acoustic RIRs but having similar ambient sounds. R-Prox is only vulnerable when the two devices are not copresent but are in rooms with similar acoustic. As long as their ambient audios are different, Sound-Proof can correctly identify noncopresence.
We have previously discussed two methods of combining R-Prox with an other system. Here the choice between the two options of parallel and pipeline depends on application scenario (whether the ground truth distribution is skewed or not) and perception (whether the use of wideband chirps need to be minimized).
Device association: R-Prox allows multiple devices to simultaneously capture the RIR signal of a sound source in an enclosed space. Any pair of devices among group of devices can verify their proximity by querying the copresence classifier. Instead of performing pairing operation on each single pair, with R-Prox, we can associate a group of devices after only a single sensing process. This application is similar to group membership management proposed by Tan et al. [39] . R-Prox offers low FNR (of 0.059) making it a nice background technique to deploy reliable applications for devices association.
VI. RELATED WORK
The two main directions for proximity verification in the literature are distance bounding (Radio-Frequency/RF distance bounding [29] , [4] , [10] , [17] , [5] ; audio distance bounding [28] ) and context-based similarity (RF based [44] , [21] , [23] , [26] ; audio [34] , [20] , [16] , [39] ; multi-context [25] , [35] , [40] , [41] ; and other context [8] , [22] , [24] , [6] ). In this section we discuss approaches of the latter which are related to our work. We first review prior work on using context information for proximity verification. For each approach we will argue why it does not meet our design goals. Next we present existing works that use RIR for localization and compare them to our approach.
A. Context-based proximity
Radio signal based context such as GPS, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth is commonly used for proximity verification. Narayanan et al. [26] studied the use of various modalities including Wi-Fi broadcast packets and access points, Bluetooth, GPS, GSM and audio atmospheric gas for private proximity detection. They concluded that Wi-Fi performs the most prominently. Krumm et al. [21] also proposed "NearMe" which also uses Wi-Fi features for proximity detection. Varshavsky et al. [44] presented Amigo to authenticate copresent devices using various features extracted from the Wi-Fi environment. Although these solutions use the radio environment in different ways, they all depend on infrastructure, i.e. availability of deployed base stations.
Acoustic proximity verification has also been studied intensively. In existing solutions [34] , [20] , [16] , [39] , devices passively perceive ambient sound, extract its features in different ways, and apply them for different purposes such as pairing, proximity verification and authentication. Halevi et al. [16] proposed to use ambient audio for proximity verification of NFC devices. In their approach, ambient sounds recorded by a pair of devices in one second are compared to each other via their maximum cross correlation. In [34] , Schürmann et al. proposed an approach where the devices extract an audio fingerprint as an energy matrix and compute the Hamming distance between their matrixes. Their method need at least 6 seconds of ambient audio to obtain an efficient fingerprint. For automatic group membership maintenance, Tan et al. [39] assumed copresent devices form a group, and by checking similarity of silence signatures extracted from ambient sound, membership of a device can be continuously verified. A silence signature is extracted based on an adaptive threshold that adjusts to each device, and separates the pattern of noisier parts and quieter parts from a recording. Two silence signatures are compared by cosine similarity. Sound-proof [20] also adopted ambient sound for two factor authentication. In their work, audio features are extracted directly from raw audio signals per frequency bands. These works largely depend on the quality of ambient sound. In many cases where both devices are in quiet environments or in noisy environments, the verification result is not reliable. Moreover, these approaches based on ambient sound are vulnerable to relay attacks [37] .
Physical environmental context such as temperature, humidity, gas, altitude etc. also have been studied for proximity verification. In their work [35] Shrestha et al. showed the feasibility of using such context.
B. Audio context for proximity verification
Ambient noise is a common context source for proximity verification, and has been used in Sound Proof [20] , Sound of Silence [39] , and the works of Halevi et al. [16] and Truong et al. [40] . In these techniques, ambient sound is first recorded and acoustic features are then extracted. Then a similarity or distance of the features are computed based on some metric. Then a classifier is used to make a copresence decision based on this similarity or difference. Comparing to other context sources such as Wi-Fi, GPS, physical environment context, audio brings several benefits. Speaker and microphone, required for producing and capturing audio, are available in most devices from computers, to smartphones, to wearable devices. Audio is efficient even with short recording times, only a few seconds compared to sometimes minutes for other context types such as Wi-Fi or GPS. Despite these benefits, integrity of ambience is susceptible to adversarial manipulation [37] . Audio context attackers simply record audio, transmit it over a high speed channel and replay it in the victims vicinity. Also, ambient audio in a silent or very noisy environments may not provide discriminative information. In addition, most existing methods use ambient sound passively that makes the system depend on the environment. Some approaches even require to use raw audio data [16] , [20] , which can raise privacy concerns. A proposed method that uses only sound signatures [39] requires long recording duration to obtain enough features.
C. RIR for localization
Room level localization techniques [19] , [30] , [42] , [45] exploit the intrinsic acoustic properties of rooms extracted from room impulse response. These approaches exploit different types of acoustic features for room localization. In RoomSense [30] Rossi et al. showed that common audio features such as Mel Frequency Cepstral (MFCC) and Linear Predictive Coding (LPC) are superior to room acoustic features such as Reverberation Time and Early Decay Time. Their results were primarily based on common audio features. SoundLoc [19] explored more acoustic features based on room impulse response including temporal features, spectral features and energetic features. EchoTag [42] and UbiK [45] use similar acoustic features based on characteristics of reflections of room impulse response in frequency domain to fingerprint locations. In all of these works, performance was only tested on a single device. For proximity verification we need to compare signals of two copresent devices. When two or more devices are involved, new challenges emerge such as hardware heterogeneity. In our work, we elaborate such challenges and show that our system overcomes variance in hardware.
Even though echolocation and room impulse response have been used for indoor localization and room fingerprint [19] , [30] , [42] , [45] , they have several limitations. First, whether room impulse response can be used for device-proximity verification has not been explored. Like other context-based proximity verification approaches, two devices in close proximity should perceive similar RIR. Second, previous works of room fingerprinting [19] , [30] only show that the same device in different places can identify the place based on room impulse response, thus omitting hardware variance. Two different device models might behave differently even if they are in the same location. In addition, room fingerprinting approaches require that the locations have been seen earlier. For proximity verification, this is an unreasonable requirement.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a technique for device proximity verification based on room impulse response, that we call R-Prox. R-Prox hardens proximity verification systems against relay attacks in current zero interaction authentication schemes. Therefore, it enhances security in presence of context attackers. We presented our methodology to extract RIR features and applied the features for building a copresence classifier. We experimented and analyzed its performance. R-Prox, in comparison to the state-of-the art solutions, is fast, efficient, and privacy-preserving. We proved that recording RIR using COTS devices is feasible. Our results show that R-Prox has low FNR (of 0.059); however R-Prox has high FPR (of 0.35) in case of no context attacker. We proposed to lower these FPRs by combining R-Prox with other system without increasing FNR (as R-Prox offers low FNR). Or in other usages, the results still suggest that R-Prox is usable, and works well as a fast kill switch for slower, more expensive, or differently defensive methods. We expect that our idea, experiments and evaluation results open opportunities for further applications relying on secure device proximity verification.
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